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This article takes into account recent developments in private international law. It focuses on finding either the 
“regulatory” or “liberalizing” role of PIL rules if one has to do with “competing norms”. The central question here is whether 
there is a need for a central European regulator in the regulation of PIL issues: to what extent does central European 
regulation of PIL issues creates either opportunities or risks, in the sense that States will be tempted to learn from each 
other either in a positive, or in a negative way? Should regulation of PIL issues at European level be welcomed, if one 
wants to avoid the “risks of unregulated competition” and if one wants to increase the level of human rights protection 
within the Union? In an attempt to answer this question, the article analyzes – seen from this perspective - the manner in 
which European authorities intervened in PIL so far, and discusses current developments and possible future actions. 
The analysis of the European interference in PIL in the article includes both the promulgation of pure PIL-rules at 
European level, as the European regulation of PIL-issues which occasionally occur in regulating other areas of law, as 
the control of national PIL-legislation by the European Court of Justice. To that end, I examine a number of case studies, 
in which either “Europe” regulated PIL issues, or the settlement of PIL issues were left to the Member States: 
international labour law; international tort law; international family law, including international family law in interaction with 
other branches of law; international company law; international contract law. The conclusion is that European interference 
in PIL shows a “double face”. The potential for European regulation of PIL issues in terms of promoting human rights and 
stimulating. Member States to implement “the best law” is high and attractive. But at the same time, it is important to be 
warned against creating dynamics of race to the bottom and reduction of the level of protection of weaker parties, 
precisely as a result of European interference in PIL issues. Consciousness of these opportunities and risks is necessary 
if one is discussing ways of avoiding unregulated competition and ways of encouraging the exchange of best practices.  
This contribution deals with the relevance of the discipline of private international law (PIL) as a means of 
promoting human rights in the European Union (EU). The search for ways of promoting human rights in the EU sparks off 
debates on issues such as regulatory competition and collective learning, and PIL may be relevant to these debates. In 
this context, I focused attention mainly on aspects of tort law, contract law, labour law and family law in international legal 
relationships. I have used some of these sub disciplines of PIL as case studies. For example, I pointed out the extent to 
which these branches of law are affected by Europeanization of PIL and discussed the question to what extent the 
European legislator gives substance to this development and the scope for policy-making to be left to the Member States; 
for example, I pinpointed the impact of Europeanization of PIL at the level of human rights protection – and, in a broader 
sense, protection of parties that are traditionally considered weaker parties in law í maintained in the EU. In the end, I 
attempted to define, in a fragmentary manner, the convergence or tension between old and new European trends to 
instrumentalise PIL, and their interaction with the promotion of human rights.  
Naturally, in discussing these case studies, I will identify developments that have occurred after I finished the 
previous article – for example, the publication of the final version of the Services Directive and the Rome II Regulation, 
recent court decisions in the field of international labour law, a recently published opinion rendered in the Grunkin-Paul 
case etc. These developments show that more and more is being regulated at European level – and I will describe the 
manner in which this has happened and the choices that have been made í but that at the same time, the European 
legislator has deliberately refrained from adopting further European rules in some cases and has left the body of national 
or already existing European PIL intact – e.g. the regulation of PIL aspects concerning defamation, even if regulation in 
this area has been postponed and may be addressed at a later stage (L. de Lima Pinheiro, 2008, p. 206-213); see also, 
for example, the exclusion of the regulation of international labour law aspects from the Services Directive. I will highlight 
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these and other developments and in that sense.  
As for recent publications, M. Watts, Guest Editorial published on the weblog www.conflictoflaws.net (2008) 
several reference points. The Guest Editorial was published under the title Reshaping Private International Law in a 
Changing World. In her Guest Editorial, M.Watt (2003 Vol.7/3) putted her finger on the problems concerned and, where 
she talks about the need for or the role of a central regulator for the regulation of PIL, she addressed the heart of the 
central question in this contribution. In it, M. Watt postulated, inter alia, in the absence of a central authority, the extent to 
which public interest concerns interfere with party choice is left to the unilateral decision of each state, in which context 
she identifies risks of under or over-regulation. M.Watt wrote about the requirements of collective welfare within the 
internal market. The creation of a central regulator that is permitted to regulate PIL aspects in some way or another is not 
self-evident: one of the essential features of the discipline of PIL is that PIL is in essence a national branch of law.  
Traditionally, national PIL rules have included defense mechanisms that allow the relevant country’s authorities to 
put a check on unlimited forum shopping and law shopping’s between legal systems – for example, by invoking the plea 
of international public order or by applying specific rules that qualify as mandatory rules (or internationally mandatory 
rules) in the forum. But at the same time, it is these very PIL rules, whether of national or supranational origin, that permit 
one or both parties to a greater or lesser extent to take advantage of differences in legislation between countries – for 
example, because the PIL rules include flexible recognition and enforcement conditions or because applicable law rules 
offer a wide range of choice of law options. PIL rules themselves sometimes create the possibility of gaining an 
advantage from foreign law or avoiding the law applicable in the forum – for example, by permitting forum shopping to a 
certain extent, by offering choice of law options, by not remedying a foreign court’s disregard of the internationally 
mandatory rules applicable in the forum in the phase of recognition of this foreign court’s decision. In a similar vein, I 
addressed the concepts of availability and transferability in a PIL context before.  
In the legal literature there are debates on whether offering such shopping options to parties ultimately results in 
the best law automatically emerging as it were. Does this ultimately lead to the creation of race-to-the-bottom or race-to-
the-top dynamics, as the question is often formulated as well. This discussion is reflected, inter alia, in a recent 
contribution by L. Pinheiro in Competition between Legal Systems in the EU and Private International Law (2008. P. 206-
213). It contains the warning that in an area such as international company law, the shopping option may be at the 
expense of the protection of legitimate third-party interests. R. Wai (p. 254), where he talked about a “basic concernࣤ: 
“Regulatory competition in an international system where private actors are able to move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in 
order to find the most favorable regulatory climate. In this situation, not only will private actors slip through the “gaps” of a 
fragmented regulatory regime, but through actual movement abroad, or threats of such movement, economic producers 
may also generate pressure on individual jurisdictions to lower domestic regulatory standards below what they would 
otherwise have been. This can be viewed as an externalities problem (…) The analysis of regulatory competition focuses 
on the challenges posed by the increasing mobility of economic actors in a global economy for the maintenance of 
domestic regulatory standards (…) The basic concern is that states will face pressure to lower their regulatory standards 
in order to attract or retain investment and employment within their borders. Examples include lowering of tax rates, labor 
standards, and environmental standards. This problem has been a common topic in discussions of regulation of 
economic activity in federal states, such as the United States. More recently, it has become a key subject in European 
integration. (…) There is a substantial academic debate as to whether international regulatory competition is always a 
“race to the bottom” If we consider the foregoing from a broader perspective, the question arises whether this kind of 
competition bxxetween legal systems may ultimately be at the expense of the level of protection of human rights and the 
protection of weaker parties in the EU. In the context of the project for which this contribution has been written and in 
which the OMC ெ method is the key element, the question also arises whether there is any risk, viewed from the 
perspective of the protection of human rights and the interests of “weak” parties, that States may “learn” from one another 
in a negative manner in this process. I.C. ‘Risks of Unregulated Competition’ – Need for a Central Regulator? – The Role 
of European Institutions or the European Member States. The foregoing justifies the following conclusion: on the one 
hand, national PIL provisions have traditionally played a regulatory role; on the other hand, liberal PIL rules at national 
level may be at the root of specific “risksெ occurring in a situation of globalization. Naturally, this observation raises the 
question whether it is desirable to create a “central regulator” able to put a check on these “risksெ. M. Watt has formulated 
it as follows in her Guest Editorial: “Indeed, inter-jurisdictional mobility of firms, products and services is once again the 
means by which law is made to appear as offering on a competitive market, designed in turn to stimulate legislative 
reactivity and creativity”. After first having issued the following warning: “Indeed, one of the most important issues raised 
by globalization from a private international law perspective is the extent to which private economic actors are now 
achieving “lift-off” from the sway of territorial legal systems. To some extent, traditional rules on jurisdiction, choice of law 
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and recognition/enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards have favored the undermining of law’s (geographical) 
empire, which is already threatened by the increasing transparency of national barriers to cross-border trade and 
investment. Party mobility through choice of law and forum indices a worldwide supply and demand for legal products. 
When such a market is unregulated, the consequences of such legislative competition may be disastrous.” 
As illustrated in the global context, one of the market failures to be feared in the context of unregulated competition 
is the exporting of costs or externalities linked to legislative choices of which the consequences may affect other 
communities. However, in an integrated legal system, these risks are restricted by the existence of a central regulator, 
armed with tools such as approximation of substantive rules, or, where diversity is deemed to be desirable, constitutional 
instruments designed to discipline the various States in their mutual dealings.ெ The central theme of M.Watt’s contribution 
is the possibility that one or both parties may take the initiative to use PIL rules for the purpose of escaping the sway of 
national provisions that nevertheless offer more protection in the area of fundamental rights and the pursuance of 
legitimate considerations – such as ensuring proper terms and conditions of employment for employees, combating 
environmental pollution etc. It is suggested in this context that if these attempts at avoiding national law are allowed 
without any restrictions, this may lead to regression and possibly even overall decline. For example, Muir Watt clearly 
makes her point that, when viewed from this perspective, there is a need for a regulatory supranational institution. But 
she does not point out how or where to find this supranational institution. However, Muir Watt draws attention to the 
“Posted Workers Directiveெ and Article 7 of the new Rome II Regulation concerning environmental pollution, but she does 
not present these as specifically “European” initiatives. 
M. Watt left open in her Guest Editorial but what is highly significant in the context of the Refgov project for which 
this contribution has been written is the role to be played by the European legislator as „central regulatorெ: Muir Watt does 
not deal – at least not explicitly í with the question whether „Europeெ could be a suitable regulator or whether it would be 
better í also for the purpose of adhering to the subsidiary principle – to entrust this regulatory responsibility, where 
necessary, to the Member States themselves (it is needed to see the discussions in this context at the time of the 
preparation of the Rome III Regulation. As for the Netherlands’s view on the adherence to the subsidiary principle, it is 
written by the Speakers of both Houses of Parliament (30 671 session year 2006-2007), available at 
http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl. As for the European Commission’s reaction to that it is needed to see:  
http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/earlywarning/doc/comments_commission). She merely states as a follow-up to the 
above quotation relating to the European Court of Justice: “Here, as recent conflicts of laws implicating both economic 
freedoms and worker’s rights have shown, the Court of Justice is invested with an important balancing function which 
clearly overflows into the political sphere”, and in a footnote she refers to the Viking and Laval decisions, which I will 
address below. In this quotation, Muir Watt rightly points to the political aspect of the balancing process í which I will 
address below as well. In my analysis I will consider the question to what extent the European institutions – both the 
Court of Justice and the European legislator – are equal to the task of reducing the “risks” caused by liberal PIL rules to a 
minimum. I will also consider the question whether it is possible í or indeed, a fact in some cases í that the European 
institutions themselves are responsible for the “risks”. To put it even more sharply: do European institutions act mainly as 
“guardian angel”, or rather as “culprit”?  
Should PIL be Regulated at European Level and, if so, How? Naturally, in areas where the European institutions 
regulate PIL, not only “national” but also “Europeanெ policy objectives will play a role. First and foremost, this includes 
considerations concerning the encouragement of the internal market, the creation of an area of freedom, security and 
justice, the promotion of European fundamental freedoms, adherence to the non-discrimination principle.  
Even if it is not true that Dutch international family law has “lost its innocenceெ in current developments, as stated 
in the second chapter, this is certainly true for PIL in the European context: in the legal literature, the “lost innocenceெ of 
PIL was hinted at before in the light of the growing impact of state interests on PIL, particularly in an integrating Europe 
within which PIL functions as a legal policy instrument (M. Wat in the Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected 
Markets – a Matter of Political Economy 2003, Vol. 7.3) From the perspective of the legal protection of “weak parties” and 
the perspective of human rights promotion within the EU, the question may arise whether this loss of innocence is a good 
or a bad thing: Do these forces affecting PIL, which are also of European origin, have any adverse effects on the legal 
protection of weak parties? Is PIL in the process of becoming an instrument that creates race to the bottom dynamics or 
is it functioning as a catalyst for more far-reaching legal protection? To what extent is PIL under pressure from concerns 
about European objectives; to what extent does this give rise to frictions with the PIL of the respective EU Member 
States; to what extent do the European institutions press ahead with the idea of regulating PIL at European level, and 
what are the effects of these dynamics when viewed from the perspective of “human rights promotion within the EU”? 
Below, I will explore a selective number of “case studies” from this perspective. 
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Specific international labour law aspects had already been regulated at European level even before the 
Amsterdam Treaty amended the EC Treaty and assigned PIL powers to the European institutions themselves. The Rome 
Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980. The EEX 
Convention, which has by now been converted into a regulation, contains í if formally applicable í procedural PIL rules: 
rules concerning jurisdiction on the one hand, and recognition and enforcement on the other. The Rome Convention 1980 
included applicable law rules that are applied by the contracting European Member States if a court in one of these 
Member States faces the question of what law is to be applied to an international employment relationship. The Rome 
Convention has existed for a long time now, but only in the near future will this PIL source become a European PIL 
source in the “true sense” of the word: the Rome Convention 1980 is to be converted into a regulation, known as the 
“Rome I” Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations) This Regulation will not include fundamental changes in the field of PIL rules 
relating to employment relationships. For example, Rome I continues to adhere to the basic principle that PIL should 
regard the employee as the weaker party that should be protected in the context of the adoption of applicable law rules – 
see also clause 23 of the Preamble of the Rome I Regulation, which reads as follows: “As regards contracts concluded 
with parties regarded as being weaker, those parties should be protected by conflict-of-law rules that are more favorable 
to their interests than the general rules”, which, as far as contracts of employment are concerned, finds expression in the 
rule provided for in Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation. Accordingly, there is no room for controversies, is there? 
Nevertheless, if we consider the European PIL rules concerning contracts of employment a little more thoroughly and in 
broader terms, it is certainly possible to make some relevant observations and to identify remarkable dynamics and areas 
of tension from the perspective of the project for which this contribution is written.  
PIL, Free Movement of Persons and Non-Discrimination: PIL as Achilles Heel of the Protection of Mobile Workers 
in Europe? Let us depart from one of the great European basic principles, particularly Article 39 of the EC Treaty 
(previously Article 49 of the EC Treaty). The first paragraph of Article 39 of the EC Treaty enshrines the principle of the 
free movement for workers, and the second paragraph includes the non-discrimination principle. Article 39 of the EC 
Treaty is certainly designed to further the economic objective of free movement for workers within Europe, but at the 
same time, it expresses a “social interest” * (inter alia, M. S. Houwerzijl, 2005, pp. 406-415; F. Hendrickx, 2007, issue 2, 
p. 43-83, particularly p. 55.) In the end, Article 39 of the EC Treaty confirms the right of the country of employment, and 
as such it is possible to pursue both the objective of the protection of equal treatment of workers within the territory where 
they reside, irrespective of whether they work on a permanent or temporary basis in the country of employment, and the 
objective of discouraging competition with respect to terms and conditions of employment. Competition with respect to 
terms and conditions of employment would not only be detrimental to a number of national social achievements, but it 
may also be contrary to the “proper” operation of the internal market, specifically fair competition. In this way, Article 39 of 
the EC Treaty ultimately succeeds in meeting both the interests of mobile workers and those of local workers and the 
interests of Member States in combating social dumping or unfair competition. Thus, Article 39 of the EC Treaty succeeds 
in striking a balance between social and economic interests. “Translated” into PIL, Article 39 of the EC Treaty would 
result in adherence to the country of employment principle in PIL. And this is what actually happens in Article 6 of the 
Rome Convention 1980. In the respective EU Member States, various labour law systems are applicable, but if an 
international labour law dispute is submitted to a court in one of the Member States, this court will usually apply the law of 
the country where the employee habitually carries out his work pursuant to Article 6 of the Rome Convention 1980. In PIL 
technical terms, this is based on the “protection principle” as recognized by PIL: the law with which the employee, being 
the weaker party, is assumed to be the most familiar is declared applicable.  
But on closer consideration, the rule based on the country of employment principle, as enshrined in Article 6, is not 
applied unconditionally after all. This is because the country of employment principle is not an absolute principle in Article 
6 of the Rome Convention 1980, if the full text of the Article is considered. As a result of choice of law options and the 
special rules included in Article 6 of the Rome Convention 1980, it sometimes happens that only the mandatory 
provisions of the country of employment are applied, and sometimes no provisions of the country of employment are 
applicable at all. For example, it may be that as a result of the application of PIL rules, an EU employee who works in 
another EU country is subject to terms and conditions of employment inferior to those applicable to local employees. In 
this way mobile EU employees may have less protection than local employees, and there is still a risk of social dumping 
after all. This is why in the legal literature PIL was labeled “the Achilles heel of the Community discrimination prohibition, 
which forms the cornerstone of the free movement of workers” (Article 6 (1) of the Rome Convention 1980, as well as 
Article 6(2), the b-situation and the “unless” provision, as well as the special scheme in Article 6(2) under (a) for 
employees who habitually work in a country but who are “temporarily” employed in another country (as for the exact 
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meaning of the concept of “temporariness”, see also Recital 36 of the Preamble to the Rome I Regulation). It turns out 
possible to escape the prohibition against discrimination based on nationality indirectly through PIL rules. If “social 
dumping” is to be avoided, a specific interpretation of the rules of Article 6 of the Rome Convention 1980 may be what is 
needed. Sometimes Article 7 of the Rome Convention – which includes the tenet of the “mandatory rules” í may also be 
invoked for the purpose of having specific “host country” rules declared applicable. It also turns out those national 
interests that reflect “protectionism” may also be presented as “humanitarian” interests, particularly if the national interest 
is presented as an interest of the mobile employee.  
In international posting situations, however, it has been found that the application of Article 7 of the Rome 
Convention 1980 may be contrary to another European freedom, particularly, the free movement of services. The 
judgment rendered by the Court of Justice in the Rush Portuguesa (C-113/89, 27 March 1990) case and later decisions 
along similar lines constituted the basis for the foregoing. In this case, the parties involved – Portuguese employees of a 
Portuguese undertaking that wanted to provide services in France í could not invoke the free movement of persons and 
the related non-discrimination principle for the purpose of setting aside a French provision relating to required work 
permits: Under the transitional scheme applicable at the time, Portuguese employees could not exercise the right to the 
free movement of persons yet. The Court found a solution, however, by invoking the free movement of services and 
stating that the French requirement constituted an unjustified infringement of the Portuguese undertaking’s right to the 
free movement of services. Later court decisions revealed a varied range of casuistic reasoning, in which the Court 
invariably had to address the question whether or not the host country’s imposition of local terms and conditions of 
employment constituted a justified infringement of the right to the free movement of services vested in a foreign European 
undertaking that posted employees abroad.  
And this is how the imposition of the host country’s labour law rules – which may be regarded as the application of 
the country of employment principle, which in itself reflects the free movement of persons – was challenged by the foreign 
service provider as being “disruptive” of the exercise of the free movement of services (Cf. Hendrickx note 9 and the 
reference to the commission report, which also points out this „disruptiveெ factor of national labour law).  
In the ECJ Arblade (1999 cases C-369/96 and 376/96, nos. 34 and 36) case, the Court ruled that the “freedom to 
provide services may be restricted only by rules justified by overriding requirements related to the public” but that “the 
overriding reasons related to the public interest which have been acknowledged by the court include the protection of 
workers (…)”. Even so, the Court had to strike a balance and the legal literature points to the “danger” of the role 
assigned to the Court of Justice in this way, particularly the danger that in balancing the free movement of services 
against the protection of mobile workers, the Court may give priority to the former interest. For example, Hendrickx (p. 14) 
in footnote 40, where he had written that the Court must strike a balance, but he went on as follows There is a real 
danger that the Court may develop an ever broader interpretation of unauthorized obstacles. In this context, the Member 
States “restrictive employment law provisions may also be regarded as barriers to the internal market”. 
Incidentally, the question whether or not PIL rules should be applied was addressed in a pregnant manner in cases 
brought before the Court of Justice, where the Court faced the question to what extent a national government is free to 
apply PIL rules in multiple nationality situations – both in family law issues and non-family law issues. This case law 
shows that through the “switch” of interaction with multiple nationalities, a case can be put on a specific track, which may 
affect the outcome of the case to a considerable extent; the manner in which Europe has “directed” and “channeled” 
these cases and its future position in this field are therefore crucial. European Interference in the Regulation of PIL in 
Interaction with the Unification of Substantive Law, Particularly, International Contract Law Questions concerning PIL in 
interaction with other branches of law have arisen in the discipline of international contract law as well. In recent years, 
Europe has been working on the unification of international contract law – by means of the conversion of the Rome 
Convention 1980 (the European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations) into the “Rome I” 
Regulation – as well as the unification of substantive contract law – by means of the project of creating a European Civil 
Code. As for both dynamics, inter alia, the publication by A. Fiorini, “The Codification of Private International Law in 
Europe: could the Community learn from the experience of Mixed Jurisdictions?”, available at www.ejcl.org, on May 2008 
in which he also stated the following on the subject of the Common Frame of Reference: “Once the material 
harmonization process is complete, there could perhaps be a case for the suppression of private international law within 
Europe: the material rapprochement would be such that the remaining differences, if any, would be easy to accept on the 
basis of a full faith and credit type clause”). Also the Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernization COM (2002) 654 final, 
under 1.6. 
The applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernization COM (2002) 654 final, 
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I briefly commented on the unification and harmonization of substantive law as a result of the creation of a “Common 
Frame of Reference” or an “Optional instrument”. The conversion of the Rome Convention 1980 into a regulation has by 
now been completed, whilst the project to create a European Civil Code is still in full swing (Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) 
OJ L177/6, 4.7.200). 
This latter project is progressing steadily, but even so, there are many question marks. I will confine myself to 
some remarks about discussions the project has sparked off in terms of fear of “social dumping” – a situation of reduced 
protection. This is because even though the creation of a European Civil Code apparently intends to offer parties an 
additional system of civil law only, which will not replace national legal systems – accordingly, the provisions designed to 
protect weaker parties incorporated into national legal systems could remain effective as such í it is still feared, insofar 
as the ECC for which parties may choose offers hardly any protection to the “weaker party” in the contract, that the level 
of protection for the weaker party will decrease if parties “choose” this ECC. It is remarkable that in the final version of the 
Rome I Regulation (contrary to the Proposal for the Regulation), no explicit reference is made to this kind of choice of law 
option (Recitals 13 and 14 of the Preamble to Rome I.). If reference is made to a “weaker party”, this means the 
consumer first of all. A topic for discussion is the extent to which not only consumers but also medium-sized undertakings 
should enjoy protection. Traditionally, PIL considers not only the consumer but also the employee to be a structurally 
weaker party. Labour law was excluded from the scope of application of the Communication from the Commission on 
European Contract Law of 11 July 2001 (see COM (2001) 398 def, no. 14). The above discussions do not concern the 
substance of labour law as such, but it is certainly conceivable that there are parallel labour law issues, because PIL 
considers consumers as well as employees structurally weaker parties, for example, and the theme of consumer 
protection is relevant to the discussion. As far as labour law is concerned, it is worth mentioning the European Labour 
Law Network, which was set up recently. See the information to be found at www.elln.eu. The main activity of this 
initiative (particularly: “The development of general rules and principles of European labour law – on the basis of law 
studies in the different EU Member States – by using a restatement approach (...)”, according to the website) is modest if 
it viewed from the perspective of unification of law trends, but this initiative may stimulate other developments, which will 
make PIL relevant in this context as well. Viewed from the PIL perspective, questions arise about the applicability of 
mandatory rules and provisions of the “normally” applicable law if the ECC is applicable pursuant to a choice of law that 
has been made. It is feared that “social dumping” would occur if, on the one hand, PIL provisions in respect of mandatory 
rules or provisions were no longer applicable, while, on the other hand, the ECC itself included insufficient protective 
provisions, for example, if it created a protection level that incorporated only the weakest protection level now existing in 
the Member States (J. Rutgers in An Optional Instrument and Social Dumping ERCL 2006, pp.199-212 et. al). In this 
respect, the relationship between the ECC and provisions from the Rome Convention 1980 or the Rome I Regulation has 
not crystallized as yet. As a matter of fact, the problem of the applicability of unified substantive law in international 
relationships, partly in relation to the Rome Convention 1980, emerged in the past in the context of the analysis of the 
applicability of European directives in the field of consumer law: in areas where the European legislator was already 
active in the field of consumer law by issuing directives, these directives usually include a PIL provision, although the PIL 
provision is usually unclear (S. Francq, 2005) Legal commentators have already complained that quite often this process 
paradoxically results in a larger diversity of conflict-of-law rules in the Member States rather than the intended 
harmonization of conflict-of-law rules and that as a result of Community interference, the unification achieved by the 
Rome Convention 1980 is being eroded (J. Meeusen, 1999-2000, pp. 434-435, with a reference to the contribution by D. 
Martiny, in ZeuP 1997, the title of which already referred to “erosion”. In this context, see also, inter alia, Recital 40 of the 
Preamble to the Rome I Regulation, as well as the “Review clause” as included in Article 27(1) (b) of Rome I) 
 For the purposes of this contribution, the question arises whether this “erosion” is limited to the unification process 
and/or whether current developments especially erode the level of protection for weaker parties. In terms of the 
achievement of the ECC project: could the ECC be at the expense of the body of PIL in the field of protection of the 
weaker party? Certainly if a choice of law is made in favor of a non-European legal system, questions arise about the 
protection of the weaker party in terms of the manner in which PIL rules interact with unified rules of substantive law. The 
Ingmar judgment showed this as well. In the ECJ, Ingmar ( 2000, case C-381/98, NJ 2005/332, footnote by T. M. de Boer 
and Rechtskundig Weekblad 2001-2002, pp. 756-757, footnote by J. Meeuse) the Court of Justice faced the question of 
the applicability of a European directive that did not include any PIL rules, in a situation in which American law had been 
chosen. The Ingmar judgment concerns the legal position of the commercial agent, but in the legal literature, it is usually 
considered from the perspective of the legal protection of employees (A.A.H. van Hoek 2003, pp. 365-379). In its 
judgment, the Court holds that Articles 17 and 18 of the Agency Directive (86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986) under 
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which the agent has specific rights after the termination of the agency contract, must be applied if the agent has 
performed his activities in a Member State, while the principal is established in a third country and the contract is 
governed by the law of this country in accordance with a clause included in it. The articles of the Agency Directive 
override the law of a non-European country chosen by the parties: in this case, the private law harmonized in a directive 
prevailed over the law designated by a conflict-of-law rule, which was in favor of the commercial agent, “the weaker party” 
in this case. Legal scholars face a tough job when it comes to interpreting the meaning of the judgment for the analysis of 
the relationship between harmonized private law in European directives and PIL. In general, the increases in the number 
of rules included in sectoral instruments that affect applicable law raise questions about the relationship with classical PIL 
rules. In the “Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980”, it was proposed, as one of the possible 
solutions to the “problem”, to include a provision in Rome I designed to safeguard the application of the Community 
minimum standard if all or some elements of the contract are connected with the Community (Green Paper on the 
Conversion of the Convention of Rome of 1980, under 3.1.2. 92 H. Muir-Watt in her contribution to the European Journal 
of Comparative Law, text and in footnotes 34 and 35).  
 In the final version of the Rome I Regulation, Article 3(4) provides as follows: “Where all other elements relevant to 
the situation at the time of the choice are located in one or more Member States, the parties” choice of applicable law 
other than that of a Member State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of Community Law, where appropriate 
as implemented in the Member States of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by agreement.ெ This could ensure a 
“European minimum”. The foregoing may be linked to an observation made by Muir Watt, where she refers to 
“requirements of collective welfare within the internal market”, and deals with the regulation by a central authority by 
means of “harmonized substantive rules” and points out the following: “Whereas they take the form of minimum standards 
for internal market transactions, they are also projected into the world market in the form of internationally mandatory 
rules in cases where the European legislator has decided that the connection with the Community is sufficient to justify its 
interest. In both instances, they are designed to provide effective regulatory frameworks within which party choice can 
operate effectively.” This, too, shows to what extent PIL rules can be decisive in ensuring „welfareெ, both in an intra-




In this contribution, I analysed the subject matter in an exploratory fashion. I have tried to show where and how regulation 
of PIL can „make a differenceெ when it comes to promoting human rights in Europe. This difference may sometimes arise 
in a rather veiled and indirect manner, but the consequences are usually far-reaching. Regulation of PIL is definitely 
relevant in one way or another. With respect to the regulation of PIL, both the possibilities and limitations associated with 
regulation at national level and the possibilities and limitations of supranational regulation by the European institutions 
should be taken into consideration. It turns out that the European legislator and the Court of Justice may fulfill their task of 
regulating PIL in different ways. The question whether PIL should be regulated at European level, and if so, how, has a 
variety of answers, depending on the subject matter and the interests involved, but it is definitely advisable to be aware of 
the dynamics and tensions in this area.   
It turns out that regulation of PIL at European level sometimes allows the extrapolation í at European level í of the 
national PIL system that provides most human rights guarantees and/or protects weaker parties in the best manner. For 
example, a victim of international environmental pollution enjoys a higher level of protection at European level than at the 
Dutch national level. European-level regulation of PIL sometimes turns out to call a halt to social dumping mechanisms, 
for instance – see, for example, the effect of the Posted Workers Directive. Viewed from this perspective, the European 
legislator may be a guardian angel, a support and a „problem solverெ of excesses that unregulated competition may give 
rise to. But European-level regulation of PIL may also show the dark side of the picture; it may even function as an evil 
genius and lie at the root of the problem. In particular, interference by European institutions may involve the risk of 
creating a „race-to-the-bottomெ mechanism and kick-starting a process of liberalization that may dismantle national 
protection and defense mechanisms. Besides, to the extent that the European regulation of PIL disputes involving a 
“weaker party” is affected at the level of the “lowest common denominator” of the Member States, there is a risk that the 
weaker party’s position will decline rather than improve.   
Hence, a European “regulator” with “two faces”, a Janus face as it were. The possibilities of promoting human 
rights that European-level regulation of PIL offers are promising. But when viewed from the perspective of the protection 
of human rights and weak parties, there are also risks. In this context, I distinguish two different types of risks in 
particular, connected with the dynamics of current European-level regulation of PIL. First, there is the risk, as mentioned 
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above, that European interference might give rise to “excesses”. In that case, the process of Europeanization may cause 
the Member States to “learn from one another” in a negative manner. National-level achievements in specific Member 
States might then have to be given up: lifting regulation to European rather than national level may mean that priorities 
other than national priorities will crystallize. In addition, there is a risk that national-level rules developed in specific 
Member States, which, essentially, should not be considered worthy of imitation, are extrapolated to the European level – 
in this hypothesis, the European legislator would “learn” from regulation at national level in a negative way, in particular, 
through the extrapolation of national procedures to the European level. By analogy, reference may be made to 
developments in European migration law, where there are attempts to extrapolate restrictive national residence 
regulations of a questionable standard to the European level.  
Then there is the risk of a division in the PIL of the Member States: insofar as European interference could be 
assessed positively, there is the risk that the Member States will not translate this positive development into their 
regulation of non-European cases. For example, I pointed out in the second chapter that the manner in which Dutch 
public authorities deal with PIL disputes involving third-country nationals weakens rather than strengthens the latter’s 
legal position, whereas in a European context í as far as European citizens are concerned í international family law 
appears to be a driving force behind more rights. In this field, it appears that the dynamics may be in stark contrast with 
each other. The underlying political policy choices differ.  
Many of the matters mentioned above involve legal policy choices94 and some of these matters are hard to assess 
in terms of normative implications. The foregoing also shows that on the basis of the legal policy choice and the 
normative judgment made, PIL may sometimes be a suitable instrument for fighting a battle “with” PIL: attempts may be 
made to use PIL for legal policy objectives. In this contribution, I have illustrated at various points to what extent PIL may 
be used for the purposes of these legal policy objectives through technical-legal means, or to what extent a specific 
“choice” may be made or implemented by resolving PIL issues. Let me conclude by saying that by 2008, the battle fought 
in the context of PIL is not only a battle for PILí the very topical question which institutions are best equipped to regulate 
PIL issues – but also a battle in PIL – the ongoing debate on how PIL issues themselves may, or should be regulated 
substantively. Finally, in some areas, the fight against environmental pollution, social dumping, for example, and the 
discussions held in this context, there is also a battle with PIL. To conclude, I express the hope that in the future PIL will 
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